Normativity and arbitrariness: The form of the will in Kant’s practical philosophy

Dr. Dirk Setton

The basic thesis of the research project is that the understanding of freedom, which is characteristic of modern normative orders, contains a tension between two formally distinct but essentially interrelated aspects: a tension between the freedom of autonomy on the one hand, in which the freedom of will and the rational insight into the binding nature of normative principles coincide, and the freedom of indeterminacy or negativity on the other hand, which, under the name of “arbitrary freedom”, emphasizes a freedom from normative and factual necessities. This thesis was defended as part of a critical examination of Kant’s practical philosophy and its precise meaning was worked out. Two interrelated questions were at the center of the project: How can (1) a conception of the ground of normativity (the “moral law” in Kant) be simultaneously characterized as the reality of the freedom of a finite will? And how is it (2) possible for a finite subject, which is constitutively dependent on sensuality and receptivity, to determine itself through the practical law of “pure reason”?
The first phase of the project was concerned with taking decisive steps towards answering the two main questions. The internal tension between autonomy and arbitrariness was, on the one hand, introduced in the context of a phenomenological reconstruction of the Kantian concept of practical self-consciousness in terms of normativity theory and, on the other hand, substantiated in terms of subjectivity theory through a reinterpretation of the concepts of practical judgment and practical imagination. The second phase of the project was characterized by an examination of the methodological prerequisites of the central argumentation. Insofar as the aim was to show the internal connection between Kant’s conception of a “law of freedom” and his conception of the reality of a finite will, the project required a conceptualization that is able to combine considerations of normativity with considerations of the reality of a finite subject. In Kant’s critical philosophy, there is a vocabulary that aims to illuminate precisely this connection: the vocabulary of the subject’s imaginative faculties. The special achievement of the concept of faculty lies in the fact that it simultaneously identifies principles of validity as principles of realization. However, as soon as it is understood in detail how normative principles can simultaneously be faculties of a finite subject and thus principles of the realization of experiences and actions, it can be shown, according to the thesis of the project, that a tension insists in the midst of cognition and volition, which in the case of a finite and free will amounts to a kind of “self-division”.
The research project was submitted as a habilitation thesis on January 31, 2018 under the title “Gesetz und Willkür: Studien zu den Begriffen des Vermögens und des freien Willens in Kants kritischer Philosophie” at the Faculty 08 of Goethe University Frankfurt and is to be published as a monograph following the habilitation procedure.

The most important publications are:

Setton, Dirk (ed.): “Das Gesetz der Freiheit als präreflexives Selbstbewusstsein: Kant mit Sartre”, in: V.L. Waibel/M. Ruffing (eds.): Akten des 12. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses ‘Natur und Freiheit’ in Wien vom 21.-25. September 2015, Berlin: de Gruyter 2018.
Setton, Dirk (2015): “The Capacity to Sustain Receptivity Spontaneously: Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience”, in: Filozofski vestnik 34:2, pp. 155-172.
Setton, Dirk (2013): “Absolute Spontaneity of Choice: The Other Side of Kant’s Theory of Freedom”, in: Symposium. Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 17/1, pp. 75-99.

The most important events of the research project were

Workshop “Revolution in the way of thinking? Kant’s Religionsschrift in der Diskussion” (together with Dr. Eva Buddeberg and Dr. Achim Vesper), 5-6.10.2017, Cluster of Excellence “Normative Orders”, Goethe University Frankfurt
Conference: “Die Rezeptivität des Urteilens: Norm und Natur III” (together with Prof. Christoph Menke), 23-25.10.2014, Cluster of Excellence “Normative Orders”, Goethe University Frankfurt
Workshop: “Other Natures. Norm and Nature II” (together with Dr. Thomas Khurana and Prof. Iain Macdonald), 30.4.-1.5.2014, Université de Montréal – Cooperative workshop of the Départment de philosophie of the Université de Montréal and the Cluster of Excellence “Normative Orders” of the Goethe University Frankfurt