The containment of instruments of force: transformation of arms control

Project manager: Prof. Dr. Harald Müller

Since modern arms control emerged in the 1950s, some of its framework conditions have changed fundamentally. The bipolar system of the Cold War no longer exists; the only remaining superpower, the USA, has turned away from its former support for multilateral, universal security institutions and is pursuing – temporarily? – selective multilateralism and in some cases aggressive unilateralism; emerging powers such as India and China could transform the international system into a multipolar system. At the same time, with the end of the bloc confrontation, the contrast between the developing and developed world gradually became more and more apparent in security policy. These changes were also reflected in the regimes for controlling nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. However, the fundamental functions of arms control – the stabilization of inter-state relations, the reduction of the security dilemma and the prevention of uncontrolled arms races and wars – have lost none of their topicality and urgency. On the contrary, in view of possible transitions of power, new security policy challenges and current technological developments, the cooperative containment of instruments of violence and regulation of inter-state relations are still fundamentally important in order to achieve a stable system of global governance.
Neither specific questions about the legitimacy and legality of certain types of weapons or the fulfillment and interpretation of commitments entered into, nor more general questions about the distribution of power in the international system or North-South cooperation and development can be fully or even adequately addressed with neo-realist, institutionalist or liberal thought patterns alone. Rather, it can be assumed that ideas about appropriateness, correctness and justice play a role in all four areas, which have so far been underexposed in the theory and practice of arms control. This project is dedicated to researching their significance for a functioning normative order for the control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Two sub-projects investigated A) where the normative positions of selected actors within the three regimes diverge or converge and how exogenous events affect the policies of these actors; what discourses of justice and conflicts of norms exist within the regimes and to what extent ethical concerns are embedded in the regimes themselves; and B) how the normative structures of international arms control regimes develop positively or negatively through the activities of “norm entrepreneurs”, through norm conflicts, through the interaction of norms and technological change and through the influence of external events.
The results of these sub-projects shed light on the role that ideas of justice play in the design of multilateral security institutions and which factors influence normative change. On this basis, praxeological concepts were also developed on how the regimes can be maintained and sustainably strengthened. Finally, the results of the sub-projects were brought together to answer the overarching research question of how and under what conditions a normative order for the control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is possible in the 21st century.
The research project was part of both the University of Frankfurt’s Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders” and the HSFK’s research program “Just Peace Governance”.

The first years of project funding were primarily concerned with developing the conceptual framework and planning the approach. Following standards research, four variables were identified as possible “drivers” of standards evolution: Conflicts over the interpretation and weighting of norms and, in particular, conflicts over justice are seen as possible regime-inherent factors. External factors include technological changes and serious changes in the international environment such as the end of the East-West conflict, upheavals in the international power structure and shock events such as September 11, 2001. However, according to our initial assumption, which was ultimately confirmed, these three factors do not necessarily lead to norm change. Rather, it requires intentional actors, norm entrepreneurs, who use the windows of opportunity created by internal and external structural events to drive norm evolution and change the normative structure.
Whether, and if so, what influence the aforementioned variables have on the creation or change of international arms control norms was examined in individual case studies using content and process analysis methods.

The most important publications in the research project include:
Müller, Harald (2010): “The Little-Known Story of Deprofileration: Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapons Activities” (with A. Schmidt), In: W.C. Potter, G. Mukhathhanova (eds.): Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century. Vol I: The Role of Theory Stanford: Stanford University Press, 124-158.
Müller, Harald (2011): “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama’ Nuclear Policy and the 2010 NPT Review Conference”, in: The Nonproliferation Review, 18 (1), 219-236.
Müller, Harald (2011): “Security Cooperation”, in: Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Leonardo Morlino (eds.): International Encyclopedia of Political Science, SAGE Publications.
Müller, Harald and Carmen Wunderlich (eds.) (2013): Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice (Series: Studies in Security and International Affairs), University of Georgia Press.